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creating an arena of strange attractors and other 
topological vector fields in which our own uncon-
scious drive is as effective as that of the steel ball 
in a pinball machine. How, then, can we isolate the 
intrinsic drive of the medium from its subservient 
position in the aesthetic, freeing its desire from the 
anthropocentric dominion? 
The point of departure lies in the concept of meta-
media, which is not to be mistaken for cross-media, 
trans-media or multi-media. In all of the latter cate-
gories, the particular media specifics are combined, 
connected and transposed to achieve a higher goal, 
to create a stronger expression of communication. 
A specific denotation of meta-media is found in the 
reversal of media-philosopher Marshall McLuhan’s 
conception4 of meta-media, referred to as ‘the total-
izing effect of media’. Media theorist Lev Manovich5 
expounded this concept by referring to it as a field 
of new interactions between form and content in the 
field of emerging media, and the convergence of 
technology and medium. 
Elaborating specifically on a particular part of the 
meta-media system is the state that occurs when a 
certain concept, belief, or idea is heavily present, 
or cultivated to such an extent that it dominates 
all other potential notions. This state of the ‘real 
virtual’6 – as opposed to virtual reality – saturates 
the mental-medium (the concept is therefore often 
referred to in terms of highly volatile media, like air 
or ether) to such an extent that the mere expression 
of it can only be demanded by a particular medium. 
Yen
Amongst the most difficult words to translate into 
English are the Portuguese word Saudade and 
the German word Sehnsucht, which – to a certain 
extent – cover the same lemma. Deeply rooted 
in romanticism, they both express a resilient and 
intense longing for something or someone, which 
comes with the admonition that this state does 
not necessarily require an actual object of desire: 
yearning for yearning’s sake is an independent, 
auto-referential condition. The English expression, 
yen, dates from the era of the passionate consump-
tion of opium, and indicates the intensity with which 
the ‘prolonged unfulfilled desire or need’ would have 
been felt, although the reference to physical addic-
tion does not include all its capacities. 
It is exactly this unfulfilled-ness which French 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan1 calls Spaltung, an 
equation involving two prosaic human drives (appe-
tite and demand), leaving a definitional gap for 
desire, which is not (able) to be satisfied.2 It is in 
this part of reality – the part that is not materialised, 
the part we call the virtual – that we find another 
vector field moving towards the one containing 
our mundane tendencies. Political theorist Jane 
Bennett calls it the vitality of (nonhuman) bodies, by 
which she means ‘the capacity of things – edibles, 
commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede 
or block the will and designs of humans, but also 
to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, 
propensities or tendencies of their own’.3 This 
exposes a mayhem of non-anthropocentric desires, 
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the failure to include this auto-referentiality. Social 
theorist and philosopher Brian Massumi’s critique 
on Baudrillard focuses mainly on the reversal of 
signification – the substitution of signs of the real for 
the real. In Baudrillard’s state of hyper-reality, signs 
would no longer represent or refer to an external 
model, but only stand for themselves and refer to 
other signs. In the words of Massumi:
In the absence of any gravitational pull to ground them, 
images accelerate and tend to run together. They 
become interchangeable. Any term can be substituted 
for any other: utter indetermination. Faced with this 
homogeneous surface of syntagmatic slippage, we 
are left speechless. We can only gape in fascination.10
Besides that, the logic of this reduction hinges 
again on the structuralist premise that there would 
be one type of systematic, with only one type of 
classification – regardless of which classifica-
tion is used – that probably largely disregards the 
perspective of the beholder. Yet it would be unwise 
to approach this mechanism of the asignifying 
sign through a phenomenological or existentialist 
gateway. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the 
concept of art lies in its potentiality: it is not what it is, 
it is what it creates in percepts and affects. Percepts 
are not perceptions and affects are not affections. 
In the words of cultural theorist Claire Colebrook, 
‘A percept is that which would be perceived, and an 
affect is that which would be felt.’11
How, then, to prevent structuralism without 
becoming rudderless, how to get to the middle 
ground, not too close, yet not too far either? First 
we need to exit the realm of representation. In order 
to do that, philosopher Gilles Deleuze proposes 
overthrowing Platonism, which in his words means:
[…] to raise up simulacra, to assert their rights over 
icons or copies. The problem no longer concerns 
the distinction Essence/Appearance or Model/
Copy. This whole distinction operates in the world 
Information is the pivoting point between the actual 
and the virtual, in this case the virtual is overflowing 
with concept, leaving no option than to crystallise in 
some type of medium. This crystallisation is contin-
gently obligatory for the emersion of expression. 
From the non-anthropocentric point of view, the 
question is, what does the medium do? What does 
it want? What does it yen for? 
For this expedition we have to distinguish a multi-
tude of layers within the definition of medium. If it 
were still possible to search for the smallest signi-
fying part within a tangible medium, the question 
arises whether that systematic would fail when 
going digital. Moreover, since the medium oper-
ates on the verge of the physical and the virtual, we 
need more abstract points of reference: the medium 
as the extension of man (effect), the medium as 
substrate (capacities), the medium as crystallised 
sensation (real virtual), and the medium as entity 
(desire). All of these are parameters for examining 
the overarching quality of the medium: the affective 
capacity of the medium (affect). Therefore we need 
to identify a medium-message system that excerpts 
itself from the realm of representation and significa-
tion: the asignifying sign.
Simulacra
The asignifying sign is not reducible to any other sign, 
yet neither it is a simulacrum in the Baudrillardian 
sense7 since it only simulates itself in relation to itself 
(and not to anything it is not): it is auto-referential by 
nature. In the Lacanian tripartite division it would be 
named the ‘real’;8 it would escape from philosopher 
C.S. Peirces infinite semiosis.9 The asignifying sign 
would be the ultimate instrument for examining its 
affective effect without ‘pollution’ from any semi-
otic systematic. Logic would dictate a search for 
an image which contained no meaning at all. For 
this, the asignifying sign should be stripped of any 
meta-language, narrative, context or symbolism, 
refusing any instruments of analysis. The main criti-
cism of Baudrillard’s four-stroke layering would be 
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the aggregation of its parts (its individuals). 
A third position could arise from the recogni-
tion of (medium) large, non-human entities that do 
not possess a social nature by default, but which 
form the true agency of society from which both 
social structure and individual activity emerge; this 
so-called ‘meso-reductionism’ could be attached to 
scholars such as Giddens. But this is not what we 
are looking for. DeLanda elaborates on Deleuze’s 
assemblage theory (he calls this a ‘neo-assem-
blage theory’ or ‘assemblage theory 2.0’). The key 
component of this theory is the acknowledgement 
of entirety as the relations of exteriority. This means 
that any assemblage consists only of the relations 
between its components, and these relations are 
determined by the capacity of the components to 
interact. These capacities might be offered by the 
components’ properties, but they can never be 
reduced simply to that. After all, the capacities are 
also dependent on the interaction within the assem-
blage. On the other hand, any component is always 
part of many assemblages, so therefore its proper-
ties can never explain the relations that are exterior 
to its body, let alone explain anything about it as a 
whole. This whole does not exist out of the connec-
tions of its components in a formally logic way, that 
would make the component a logically necessary 
part of that totality (and assuming a predeterministic 
position, the whole is then supposed to be prior to 
its own existence). Rather, these relations are ‘only’ 
contingently obligatory in order to create the whole. 
In addition to this, DeLanda defines the concept 
of assemblage along two dimensions: ‘One dimen-
sion or axis defines the variable roles which an 
assemblage’s components may play: from a purely 
material role at one extreme of the axis, to a purely 
expressive role at the other.’18 The second meas-
urement defines ‘variable processes in which these 
components become involved and that either stabi-
lize the identity of an assemblage […] or destabilize 
it’.19 The stabilising processes are referred to as 
of representation. The goal is the subversion of this 
world, ‘the twilight of the idols.’ The simulacrum is not 
degraded copy, rather it contains a positive power 
which negates both original and copy, both model and 
reproduction. Of the least two divergent series interi-
orized in the simulacrum, neither can be assigned as 
original or as copy.12
The danger in this reasoning is to assume that 
images start with their ‘physical’ appearance; it is 
rather the consumption that proves their existence. 
If an individual regards an image as an image, than 
that individual is already primed13 to see an image. 
Psychotherapist and philosopher Felix Guattari 
suggests ‘It is simply quite wrong to regard action 
on the psyche, the socius, and the environment 
as separate.’14 And as it is impossible to prevent 
Deutung at any level. It is wise to define simulacra 
in a detached and abstract way (as opposed to the 
concrete and direct Baudrillardian approach). At 
this point, Deleuze’s definition of simulacra seems 
to suit best: ‘those systems in which different relates 
to different by means of difference itself. What is 
essential is that we find in these systems no prior 
identity, no internal resemblance’.15
 
‘Eye’ of the beholder
Secondly, to reattach the human to the aesthetics 
would also demand a search for the middle ground 
(the excluded middle),16 and for this it would be 
helpful to consider philosopher and artist Manuel 
DeLanda’s position on reductionism.17 DeLanda 
distinguishes what he calls ‘macro-reductionism’ 
whereby the existence of individual persons is 
acknowledged, yet the assumption is made that 
they would have completely co-opted the values of 
a higher social order or class to which they suppos-
edly belong (individuals are products of society, 
pars pro toto). He refers to the work of Durkheim, 
Marx and Parsons in this respect. Unsurprisingly, 
the opposite position would be that of ‘micro-reduc-
tionism’, which states that ‘society as a whole’ does 
exist, but only by the grace of being the surplus of 
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Virtual and sublime
The third and final element to consider is how the 
asignifying sign relates to the realm of the virtual 
and the sublime. As Deleuze points out:
Aesthetics suffers from an agonizing dualism. On the 
one hand it designates a theory of feeling as the form 
of possible experience; on the other, it marks out a 
theory of art as the reflection of real experience. In 
order for these two meanings to join, the conditions of 
experience in general must become the conditions of 
real experience.24
But how does this work when the experience is not 
yet experienced, if it is still in the pre-conscious 
phase? To approach this topic we return briefly to 
philosophy scholar Daniel W. Smith25 as he summa-
rises Deleuze’s theory of Sensation:
In the ‘Analytic of the Sublime’, the faculty of the 
imagination is forced to confront its own limit, its own 
maximum: fated with an immense object […] or a 
powerful object […], the imagination strives to compre-
hend these sensations in their totality, but is unable 
to do so. It reaches the limits of its power, and finds 
itself reduced to impotency. This failure gives rise to 
a pain, a cleavage in the subject between what can 
be imagined and what can be thought, between the 
imagination and reason.26
This gap, this yearning, can well be understood 
in a natural context or in a context of growth and 
experience; to engage in such systems even seems 
unavoidable, just for the purpose of learning itself. 
But when we look at a system in which the expo-
sure to a body of the sublime is not incidental; i.e., 
manmade and deliberately frequented, then some-
thing else must be at work, since it is evident that 
the yearning is not felt because it occurs as part 
of the experiencing of the sublime, but more likely 
because of the sensation of the yearning itself. 
The yearning is not meant to be stopped – it is 
the yearning that we yearn for. To a great extent 
territorialisation, and the destabilising processes 
as deterritorialisation. Thus, to prevent any (post-) 
structuralism, it will always be essential to include 
‘The “Eye” of the Beholder’ (EotB) – note that eye 
is already a metaphor – which indicates the abso-
luteness of actuality and psychological temporal 
conditions of the author casu quo the interpre-
tant, and his or her existence in the assemblage 
(Ironically we need a sign to indicate this: ). 
Now this is where it becomes very interesting 
in terms of the asignifying sign. Following painter 
Francis Bacon, the sign has a very brutal quality, it 
can bypass our consciousness, prevent any inter-
ference by the brain whatsoever, and go straight to 
our nervous system. This occurs before recognition, 
automation and classification. At the very moment 
it acts in this way, it deterritorialises the system to 
which it also belongs (a semiotic system for example) 
to such an extent that it will not be able to hold its 
position in the assemblage; it has become a free 
radical.20 This is the ‘moment’ before causality kicks 
in – without causality there is no chronology – it is a 
state of non-chronological time.21 This is when the 
Eye of the Beholder  is not yet assured; or to be 
more precise, it is in fact ruptured (Deleuze calls this 
the ‘fissure’). The fissure of EotB  can be under-
stood as the birthplace of the crystal image.22 It is the 
ratio cognoscendi of time. How to understand could 
not exist without those who understand. Obviously 
the asignifying sign can only exist very briefly, its 
own appearance creates a point of reference and 
changes the field in which it appears. But since the 
Dynamic Interpretant23 is born every split second, 
these instances of existence appear unconnectedly 
continuative, at best categorised by their capacity 
to affect (affordance). Should an asignifying sign 
survive its own appearance, the moment it shows, it 
will act self-referentially.
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(symbolic) narratives, various (visual) semiotic 
and semantic systems, and many denotative and 
connotative layers. The logic in this comes from 
the proposition that any constructed image has 
no representational value at all, representation 
does not exist, returning here to the real virtuality 
through the work of psychologist J. J. Gibson: 
‘Images are neither necessary for thought nor for 
perception!’ As a consequence of this, there would 
be no fundamental difference between the empty 
canvas or the saturated photograph, the image 
itself does not provide the modes of perception. 
Besides this, the canvas would never be empty to 
start with (as Deleuze puts it, we always start in the 
middle; thought has no beginning, just an outside 
to which it is connected). To steer away from any 
over- or misinterpretation, or actually, from any 
interpretation at all (the asignifying sign operates 
on the pre-conscious level), it would seem prefer-
able to forcefully, perhaps even violently, attack our 
modes of perception. The empty canvas leaves too 
much room for interpretation; the abstract image 
makes it even worse. It becomes really serious if 
the artist starts to believe in the independent state 
of Deutung34 as the genesis of the deeper. Painter 
Kasimir Malevich wrote after a visit from his friend, 
the poet Velimir Khlebnikov,35 who was heavily 
involved in calculating laws of causality:
The numbers that Khlebnikov has discovered [in 
my paintings red.] suggest that something powerful 
lies within ‘Supremus’; an inherent law governs this 
sphere, perhaps the very same law that has guided 
world creativity. Through me passes that same force, 
that same mutual harmony of creative laws that 
governs everything. Whatever existed heretofore just 
wasn’t the real thing.36
This raises several questions since Malevich’s 
suprematism was oriented towards the circum-
vention of the system of sense-making, as he 
adequately stated:
one might wonder if this system is fundamentally 
different from the system of desire. 
Lacan distinguishes desire from need and 
demand. Desire is the excess produced by the 
enunciation of need in demand. ’[D]esire is neither 
the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, 
but the difference that results from the subtraction 
of the first from the second, the very phenomenon 
of their splitting’ (Spaltung).27 Hence desire can 
never be satisfied, or as sociologist and philosopher 
Slavoj Žižek28 puts it: ‘desire’s raison d’être is not to 
realize its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to repro-
duce itself as desire’. Can we boldly replace that 
desire with our yearning, or vice versa? That would 
imply that the yearning for the sublime equals the 
demand for love minus the experience itself.29 If we 
regard the sublime as a proto-theory of singularity30 
and widen the definition of desire to ‘a process 
of production without reference to any exterior 
agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a 
pleasure that fills it’31 then it would make a perfect 
fit. According to Deleuze, the work of art is first and 
foremost a machine that produces a sensation:
By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the 
percept from perception of objects and the states of a 
perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections 
as the transition from one state to another: to extract a 
bloc of sensations, a pure being of sensation.32
This is the quest at this moment: the appearance of 
the asignifying sign, also known as the punctum33 
(or to be more precise; the pre-punctum without the 
studium), also known as the singularity, formerly 
known as the sublime, is the precise topic of this 
paper.
Natures of pervasion as sets of relations
The central premise in this experiment is that the 
asignifying sign is most likely to exist in an envi-
ronment which is highly charged with (visual) 
information, probably containing a multitude of 
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existence. It is when time is only expressible as a 
singularity, which, in the words of architectural theo-
rist Sanford Kwinter, can be understood as ‘those 
critical points or moments within a system when 
its qualities and not just its quantities undergo a 
fundamental change’.39 The asignifying sign is a 
singularity par excellence. Bear in mind that this 
discussion has no relation to the transition of time 
in mediated form. Any mediated distortion of time 
solely indicates the transition of the temporal and 
spatial conditions of object/subject; namely, the 
artificial conversion of the here and now, into the 
everywhere and always.
Media
Media theorist Thomas Mitchell40 goes straight to 
the heart of the discourse when he claims: ‘Images 
are like living organisms; living organisms are best 
described as things that have desires (for example, 
appetites, needs, demands, drives); therefore, the 
question of what pictures want is inevitable.’ Yet 
according to the initial premises, this argument 
lacks two essential elements; firstly, the issue of 
representation. Following Bennett, we would not 
need any comparison to a living body to deal with 
the question of the desire of matter, even without 
short-circuiting the matter-image in the Bergsonian 
sense. Building on the work of sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman,41 we could claim that under the social 
conditions of liquid modernity, a mediated state 
of affairs is the closest, if not the only, perceiv-
able shape of veracity. Leaving the notion of pure 
trueness on a conceptual sheet, we could adopt 
media theorist Mark Deuze’s42 concept of a life 
lived not through, but in the media. In that condi-
tion, the alterity of all the physical is owned by our 
individual perception and subjective representation 
of neutrality, and the closest ‘moment of objectivity’ 
is only generated by the accumulation of all medi-
ated notions. Presupposing that non-human bodies 
would have desires, then the question would not be, 
‘What desires do they have?’ but, ‘What desires do 
they have under which conditions?’ Or, to be even 
Under Suprematism I understand the primacy of pure 
feeling in creative art. To the Suprematist, the visual 
phenomena of the objective world are, in themselves, 
meaningless; the significant thing is feeling, as such, 
quite apart from the environment in which it is called 
forth.37
This apparent conflict between sensation and 
sense-making, suggests that we need to start at 
the other end; we need to overwhelm our capaci-
ties with information, overload our circuits. To stack 
meaning upon meaning, sign upon sign, semiotic 
on semiotic and convention on convention beyond 
the point at which the system collapses, to the point 
where we simply can’t make any sense out of it. 
That is the precise moment the asignifying sign 
appears. However, this moment has nothing to do 
with duration of time, it is the moment chronos (in its 
appearance as one of the avatars of kairos) stops 
unfolding out of aion. It is the moment before the 
causality of logic, consciousness and sense-making 
sets time in motion, before the transgression from 
the static universal to the dynamic individual. This 
is the moment of the fissure in The Eye of the 
Beholder . The asignifying sign is not only a sign, 
it is a conditionality which seems more likely to be 
composed in a highly saturated environment rather 
than in a low saturated field. The descriptions used 
here are mere reflections of the progression of 
time from the moment it transgressed from aion to 
chronos. Any shape of kairos stands to chronos, as 
an Euclidean space stands to a topological space. 
It is the trace the snake leaves in the sand after it 
moves through it, it is the shadow cast on the wall. 
Therefore we can never totalise all kairos into one 
chronos.
When Deleuze writes that ‘the crystal reveals a 
direct time-image, and no longer an indirect image 
of time deriving from movement. It does not abstract 
time; it does better: it reverses its subordination in 
relation to movement’,38 he is expressing that exact 
moment when aion is addressed solely on its very 
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about representation.
Although Deleuze is obviously referring to media 
as part of a much bigger system than what is being 
directly dealt with here, it cannot be denied that the 
structural changes in society with respect to the role 
of the media will affect our efforts to incorporate the 
role of the media from the times of Guy Debord. 
With the acknowledgement of this impossible unifi-
cation, by amplifying one’s own (political) vision, the 
discussion shifts from what is true to: ‘is this partic-
ular truth more valuable than that general notion 
of truth?’ By adopting the above-mentioned notion 
of fragmentation as the creation of a whole by the 
collection of its fragments, we – the present – can 
enter the field of games and still produce very valu-
able truths to prevent us from becoming mindless 
spectators. Guy Debord asserts:
The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as all of 
society, as part of society, and as instrument of unifi-
cation. As a part of society it is specifically the sector 
which concentrates all gazing and all consciousness. 
Due to the very fact that this sector is separate, it 
is the common ground of the deceived gaze and of 
false consciousness, and the unification it achieves 
is nothing but an official language of generalized 
separation.47
The effects of exposure, the endurance of the spec-
tator, and the seemingly distant state of the events, 
create a different mindset, a different mental model. A 
result of spectatorship in the Debordian sense could 
have been that the passive-participant felt confirma-
tion in the fact that all problems could be solved in 
ninety minutes, that cars did not need gasoline, 
heroes did not use the bathroom and dark alleys 
were always dangerous. These notions were not 
mental models when they were initially presented, 
but became so when they became part of a view 
that was reflected in the organisation of a social 
covenant such as modernity. By constantly rein-
forcing comparable notions in a society, obviously 
more precise: ‘I never desire something all by itself, I 
don’t desire an aggregate either, I desire from within 
an aggregate,’ as Deleuze explains.43 The definition 
of the aggregate (assemblage) should also come 
from within the assemblage itself. 
Amidst the techno-social avalanche in which 
media transforms into an amorphous, ubiquitous 
entity, it is not surprising that the cry for reconnection 
with the non-mediated generates a revitalisation of 
a desire for the lived incident. Incorporating strat-
egies such as dérive44 seems to have a potential 
in facilitating this aspiration, but given that the rela-
tion between the lived and the represented has a 
dichotomous character in this context, it would not 
appear to be possible to translate such techniques 
directly into an exploration and mapping tool for 
socio-aesthetic conditions if we want to include 
the use of any medium. Yet it would be unwise to 
classify this failing attempt as an unjustifiable exer-
cise. As much as the dérive was not about finding 
reality, Kino-Pravda45 was not about finding truth. 
Both strategies are basically games with only one 
player. The mere fact that this player entered the 
game created a fundamental gap between player 
and game board, leaving all notions of objectivity 
behind. The creation of a third way, a dismantling 
of the artistic Tower of Babel46 as filmmaker Dziga 
Vertov suggested, seemed appropriate in making 
way for the omnipresent distances between the 
investigator and the investigated, whether it be the 
heroic cameraman, or the flâneur versus the old 
city. To incorporate the drift merely as an objec-
tified instrument for socio-urban exploration without 
connecting to its ideology or translating its socio-
political objectives into one’s own aspirations, 
would completely denounce its original intentions 
and, ironically, transform the event into a spectacle. 
Besides, the drift requires an ‘un-mediated’ level of 
participation, and therefore it seems impossible to 
incorporate any medium during the act itself. Only 
in hindsight could one reflect using transferal inter-
mediates. But this is not about embodiment, nor is it 
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of its affective quality; a comparison could be made 
with an iso-affective49 argument that would link to 
the initial argument of the relative efficiency of the 
medium, seen from the perspective of drive (and the 
inherent relation with the affective facets of events). 
It is unmanageable to distinguish anything but scale 
in these systems; it is impossible to pinpoint the 
exact moment of affection. The Portuguese claim 
that only a Portuguese can understand the full 
meaning of Saudade, and even then there would 
be a semantic gap, since it is precisely the unname-
able unfulfillable which holds the key. This gap is 
not meant to be filled, since it is the yearning we 
yearn for. The asignifying sign cannot be isolated, it 
is neither here nor there, yet it is conditionally omni-
present, it inhibits the gap, its desire is to affect. To 
end with the legendary words of Dziga Vertov:
I am kino-eye. I am a builder. I have placed you, whom 
I’ve created today, in an extraordinary room which did 
not exist until just now when I also created it. In this 
room there are twelve walls shot by me in various parts 
of the world […] From one person I take the hands, 
the strongest and most dexterous; from another I take 
the legs, the swiftest and most shapely; from a third, 
the most beautiful and expressive head - and through 
montage I create a new, perfect man.50
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such notions take hold, regardless of their origin – if 
there ever was an original. We need to reassess 
our relation to the media in the same way we need 
to reassess the relationship between the individual 
and the social: the media has become part of our 
environment. To assume that one can still maintain 
a certain distance and have some degree of control 
over the media’s influence is rather dangerous: 
awareness of the socio-political implications is not a 
topic of the media, the media is the topic. According 
to Felix Guattari:
The decisive factor, it seems to me, is the general 
inflexibility of social and psychological praxes – their 
failure to adapt – as well as a widespread incapacity 
to perceive the erroneousness of partitioning off the 
real into a number of separate fields. It is quite simply 
wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius, 
and the environment as separate. Indeed, if we 
continue – as the media would have us do – to refuse 
squarely to confront the simultaneous degradation of 
these three areas, we will in effect be acquiescing in 
a general infantilization of opinion, a destruction and 
neutralization of democracy.48
Conclusion
This article does not strive to reach a conclusion; 
that is, the answer to its central question: what 
does the medium want? ‘Medium’ can be seen as 
sets of relations, an interplay of thresholds that 
use information, blocks of sensation, to hybridise 
the virtual (as in real virtual) and the actualised. 
Medium is always a conditional ecology of (non-) 
human capacities and desires, and therefore it is 
already plural from the start. It is the yearning that 
is the central force of interaction – the true interac-
tion between medium and man works not through 
narrative or representation, it emanates through the 
asignifying and the affective. In order to be able to 
move towards an understanding of its workings one 
has to become part of that same system, since only 
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